New Euro Nativists: “Breivik Not Our Man!” From 2011


Anders Breivik and the New European Nationalists: “Not Our Man” 

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COMMENTARY: The murder of innocents in Norway by a zealot identifying with the extreme right, called Anders Breivik, has caused some disassociation and position-taking by the so-called “new nationalist” parties in several European countries. These, like the Wilders party, PVV, in the Netherlands, or the Sweden Democrats, have made sudden electoral gains, on the back of campaigns against mass immigration, especially if Islamic. (See EUAustralia Online: “Finland vote latest in Euro-nationalist trend”, 22.4.11; “Voting: tense count in Sweden, 22.9.10; “Wilders, horse-trading …”, 5.9.10).

They have been at pains to point out that the Norwegian gunman, if singing from some pages in their songbook, was an isolate; that they concentrate on legal parliamentary politics; that they have broken  their links with a fascist past, or, in cases like the Netherlands, never had such a past; and that they do not sympathise with, let alone provide any infrastructure for terrorist activities. While police in Europe have been taking a prudent look at some of the rhetoricians and associations on the radical right, few accusations have actually been made that these new parties condone egregious violent crimes. (Criticism in the liberal press is rather that extreme ideas will feed into the fantasies of weak types, and the insane).

 

Anders Breivik murdered 77 innocent Norwegians, and injured somewhere around 100. He has alluded to a pair of ‘neo-Templar’ cells still active in the field, though his actions suggest a lone gunman isolated from the kind of support afforded to terrorist operations – Islamic or others.

The Norwegian head of domestic intelligence, Ms. Janne Kristiansen, has refuted claimed he was linked him to the broader ‘counter-Jihad’ movement.

“We don’t have any indications that he has been part of a broader movement or that he has been in connection with other cells,” she said.

Unlike the 9-11 attacks on New York there was no institutional support, no jubilant militants who believed that Breivik was victorious in the quest for righteous vengeance, there were no follow- up attacks or credible threats.  At least no such threats have been made public.

A few of the right-wing European nationalists, such as Lega Nord MEP, Mario Borghezio, may have praised Breivik’s largely plagiarised manifesto, but no one condoned his violent lunacy.

Posters on the English Defence League (EDL) online forum showed a universal revulsion against Breivik’s massacre; some for most evident selfish reasons, being concerned the police and a largely hostile media would increase their focus on the social street protest movement.

The same revulsion was apparent in the content and comments of leading ‘counter-jihad’ blogs like gatesofvienna.blogspot.com and vladtepes.com.

wilders2.jpgThis review is of course informal and provides no complete evidence of the ‘counter-jihad’ movement’s general opinion of Breivik’s actions, though in conjunction with public utterances by the likes of the Dutch leader Geert Wilders (picture) and Steven Yaxley Lennon of the EDL, it is fair to suppose this position is effectively universal, at least amongst the leadership.

It’s important to note that Breivik was not a White supremacist, nor a neo Nazi.

Neo-liberal critics of Islam, such as Pim Fortuyn, Ayaan Hiirsi Ali and Bruce Bawer have described Islam as a new totalitarian threat. (Likewise, more traditionalist ‘counter-jihad’ intellectuals like the blogger ‘Fjordman’ have been largely critical of totalitarian ideas in Islamist movements, and totalitarian practices in Islamic states).

Their principal program has been to end or at least reduce immigration, in conjunction with a reassertion of European Enlightenment values and identity, which they believe to have been suppressed during a period of multicultural political “correctness”.

Breivik appeared to be of a similar mind. He was pro-gay rights and pro-Israeli, though of course no classic liberal or civic nationalist of note has ever considered mass murder a viable path to a restoration of European cultural self-confidence contra Islam.

Positive appraisals of Breivik’s deranged act of terrorism seemed as anomalous as his violence.

THE EUROPEAN “COUNTER-JIHAD” MOVEMENT

As a terrorist he would be delusional in two senses:

Firstly, in his belief that exploding a bomb in Oslo and murdering a group of children on camp was somehow an act worthy of a warrior-knight he falsely believed himself to be.

Secondly, and providing stronger evidence of his departure from reality, was the idea that such heinous and cowardly acts would somehow inspire anything but horror in Europeans, including those active in, or sympathetic to the political organisations self-described as Europe’s “counter-jihad” movement.

The democratically inclined nationalist parties of the right in Western Europe have campaigned openly and grown from strength to strength.

haydn-dewinter-with-anti-islam-banner.jpgTheir growth is one of the defining issues of contemporary European politics, along with the continent’s economic woes and the travails of the European Union.

Parties that expressed concern about the fragility of indigenous European culture in light of an assertive and sometimes aggressive Islam have been finding a resonance with significant sections of the public.

In has happened to the point where they are a part of governing coalitions (the Lega Nord in Italy); where the government is reliant on their support (Geert Wilder’s Party for Freedom), or where they form a significant and constant portion of the opposition (The French National Front).

The old far right of earlier post-war days has been replaced by a more erudite, democratic, moderate and flexible “nativist-populist” political formation, that speaks of a national identity, European civilisation, tradition and a defence of Western values against a totalitarian, alien Islamism.

For the most part they are a million miles away from goose steppers and racial imperialists; the platform focuses on cultural assertion and sovereignty, and they differ from neoconservatives in their almost unanimous call for a withdrawal from foreign wars.

They are often sympathetic or ambivalent to Zionism and the Jewish state, if only to be consistent in their ethno nationalism, and to dissipate the aura of anti-Semitism that some of the parties have inherited – “If the Jewish people can have an ethnic state the Flemish (French, English, Dutch, etc., etc.) should be able to have one as well.”

Of course the Israelis and the new European nationalists may perceive that they have a shared enemy in Islamist movements, but again, they aren’t the Christian Zionists referred to as “Israel Firsters” by their critics.

That said, links between conservative Zionists and the new European nationalists are becoming increasingly apparent.

On the centre-left side of politics, their platform seems to resonate strongly with ex-social democrat voters alienated by an emphasis on the part of the main centre-left parties, on multiculturalism, seen to be at the expense of the autochthonic working class.

The same platform has been taken up on the centre-right side, by small business conservatives  concerned about globalism and a lack of sovereignty for nation states, as championed by the neoliberal centre right.

The voters of such parties are certainly not part of the Davos set, and Western European political elites, long secure in a rather unchallenged political consensus, have come to shown a clear awareness of the new European nationalist impact.

Abandonment and criticism of policies promoting multiculturalism by the centre right can be largely attributed to the growth of the “nativist” and “counter-jihad” political parties and social movements.

ISOLATION OF NEW NATIONALISTS

The self-described nativist challenge to multiculturalism generally received short shrift until the advent of political success for the new European nationalist parties and social movements.

Though still derided as fascists, neo-Nazis, racists, bigots, haters, or lately, ‘Islamophobes’ (whether such descriptors are universally accurate is debatable), by their political opponents; such critics of Islam and multiculturalism have had to be taken seriously if political elites were to retain power.

If anything the new European nationalists are most accurately referred to as “nativists”, and often adhere to an exclusive nationalism that is both civic and ethnic.

The political community looks to have understood that there is considerable popular resentment against mass immigration into Europe, particularly by Muslims who would rigorously adhere to political aspects of their religion, mutually exclusive in relation to prevailing Western norms.

While the parties are called far right they have no affiliation with traditionalist, upper class interests.

Given the socio-economic circumstances of so many of their target constituency, they have taken up protectionist economic policies and support the maintenance of social welfare — for “native” citizens.

The Sweden Democrats leader, Jimmie Akesson, has stated that his party supports the continuation of the welfare state and social democracy.

lepen-22.jpgMarine Le Pen (picture), leader of the Front National has said:  “Globalisation means getting slaves to make things abroad to sell to unemployed people here.”

It is a message that will no doubt appear attractive to manufacturing workers and the like who’ve had their livelihood diminished or destroyed in the processes of economic “liberalisation”.

Opinions of the “native” European man and woman most economically challenged by the process of globalisation are rarely fashionable.

Their demands for economic and cultural security are often derided as parochial or regressive, while such concerns have been taken on board by the new Nationalists.

Perhaps the voice of patriotic and nativist sentiment against mass immigration, Islam and an EU referred to as the ‘European Union of Soviet Socialist Republics’, may relieve the emotional pressure felt by many native Europeans.

It might be conceded even by sympathetic friends that frustration may drive such identities into a despairing retreat from the mainstream political process, with the more bellicose then moving in dangerous directions.

Incompetent leadership in their own ranks and what they will see as “lawfare” against militant activity, would contribute to this frustration.

It remains though, that the new nationalist parties have not moved to terrorism or militarised violence.

They might well deny Anders Breivik; he looks to be simply as insane as he was violent.

It seems impossible that such a wildly and dangerously deluded individual, laying claim to the murders that took place, could have been satisfied with a political or social life of any kind; but rather would be satisfied with nothing at all, but a wanton and violent outcome.

 

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No More ‘Islamophobia’ for the Associated Press

The Associated Press’s recently updated style guide forbids its journalists to use ‘Islamophobia,’ and ‘Homophobia’.

‘Islamophobia’ is term researchers would be wise to avoid as a general rule due it’s pejorative nature. It alludes to the fact that ‘Islamophobia’ is a mental illness which it may be in some cases, Breivik for example. But others have a more nuanced, reasoned critique of Islam (or Islams of various kinds). For others not so well reasoned there concerns about Islam do not equate to a mental illness.

Researching into such a contentious area of politics and communication, makes word choice crucial in the quest for the most accurate definition of phenomena.

It tends to be wise to use what organisations and individuals call themselves, and/or develop as neutral a term as possible after researching their platform, whether nativist, Islamist or otherwise.

D|C

 

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Swiss People’s Parties Mascot Stolen… Goat Accused of “Spreading Racist Paranoia!”

As a general rule analysing political communication is a serious business. Mosque occupations, campaigns focusing on halal butchery and sharia law are not intrinsically humorous.

Some levity is on order on rare occasion.

While researching an article on the SVP I came across an unusual ‘anti-fascist’ action. Instead of batting nationalists/nativists on the streets or putting up posters they stole a goat. Not just any goat, but Zottel, the SVP’s mascot and good luck charm.

Zottel… Fascist Goat Spreading Nativist Proganda

Poor treatment of animals is abominable. Fortunately Zottel was returned unharmed, though painted black. Whether or not this is counts as animal cruelty is a matter of contention, but it was pet theft no doubt.

In a tongue-in-cheek letter by the radical left group, they accused the goat of “general hostility to the proletariat” and “spreading racist paranoia.”

 

 

 

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Media Savvy Reconquistadores: The Identitarians and the Occupation of the Poitiers Mosque

Media Savvy Reconquistadores: The Identitarians and the Occupation of the Poitiers Mosque

On the 20th of October 73 activists of Generation Identitaire (GI) occupied the site of the unfinished Poitiers Grand Mosque. They unfurled a banner that read, ‘732 GENERATION IDENTITAIRE’. They demanded a referendum on Islam and immigration into France.

The action was not without precedent, nor was it without warning.

GI launched its two and a half minute ‘Declaration of War’ on You Tube on the 4th of October. The declaration features an array of young faces denouncing the legacy of the French left radicals of ’68. The GI nativists describe a situation in which they are the victims of anti-white racism, the deliberate destruction of French traditions, failed multiculturalism, pointless foreign wars, and a parlous economic future.

 

Still from Generation Identitaire’s ‘Declaration of War’ on You Tube

 

The narrative is emotionally driven and gives no details of the conflict to be. It can only be assumed the occupation is the first action in their war.

 

Poitiers Mosque: The First Sortie in the Identitarian Media War

The year 732 is historically significant as it is the year Frankish king, Charles ‘The Hammer’ Martel, beat an invading army of Muslim Moors at Poitiers. Martel’s victory against the Moors is often considered a defining moment in the defence of Europe against an expansive Islam.

The choice of the Poitiers Mosque and the evocation of the memory of Charles Martel are in accord with the previous acts of strategic provocation and nativist protest of the GI’s parent movement, the Bloc Identitaire.

The BI apply similar methods to provocateurs like People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, environmentalists, or US prolife protestors who engage in contentious, and sometimes illegal direct actions and non-violent protests in the attempt to set media agendas. Protests designed to gain attention have been the identitairians weapon of choice in their battle for an ethno regionalist France, and ultimately Europe.

The BI have been engaged in actions designed to raise awareness of their key issues since the movement’s inception in 2003. The most internationally significant of these was the 2010 Sausage and Plonk parties designed to draw attention to the Muslims illegally praying on the streets of Paris, and define a sharp difference between the alcohol and park laden traditional cuisine of France and the absence of both in Islam. The parties made international news when they were banned as the police considered them a racist provocation. According to the BI they drew attention to the Muslim’s illegal street prayers, an issue adopted by Marine Le Pen in the recent presidential election.

 

The Difference Between Marine Le Pen’s Front National and the Identitairians

Under Marine Le Pen the Front National has moderated its message and now stands as a party that sits on the fence between ethnic and civil nationalism. Le Pen’s public utterances are anti-globalist and staunchly in support of the secular republic against the perceived religious fervour of elements of Muslim immigrant populations.

Though they utilise many of the same themes, the Identitarians have a diverse array of influences: non-Marxist socialists, the Italian communist, Antonio Gramsi’s approach to hegemony and metapolitics, Catholic social teaching, Swiss style direct democracy and the French Nouvelle Droite (ND New Right).

Unlike the FN they do not place primacy on the centralised French state and identity, but rather the ‘organic’, polycentric regional ethnicities whether Breton, Alsatian, or Basque among others. This extends to environmental, social and cultural issues. There is an allegiance to France, but more importantly an allegiance to the continent, in accord with the Europe of a 100 Flags as advocated by the Breton nationalist Yann Fouéré.

This has led to an alliance with other ethno regionalist movements, like the Flemish Interest, the Lega Nord and the Platform for Catalonia. All these groups share a desire to build, maintain, and strengthen their own stateless ethnic identities whilst maintaining a critical focus on the perceived danger of Islam to Europe in general and their ‘ethno-nations’ in particular.

 

A Better Yesterday – A Better Tomorrow

For contemporary nativist Gramscian all political communication can be considered memetic conflicts in the ideosphere – advertisers, political and otherwise, are aware nostalgia and hope are potent tools.

The BI’s symbolic communication is essentially the fusion of pop culture and a traditionalist aesthetic. The symbol of the BI is a shield with the Greek letter ‘L’ (Lambda) on it. It was made most famous by Frank Miller’s graphic novel 300, and the subsequent film. 300 is a fantasy account of the battle of Thermopylae where 300 Spartans and an array other Greeks stood fast against an invading Persian army. The intent is to symbolically demonstrate role the Identitairians play in the enduring trajectory native European defenders against aggressive foreign ideas, beliefs and peoples.

The Identitairians aim to combine the historical weight of a European narrative with cutting edge modes of communication. They sense a repressed anger at the political and media elites simmering amongst a significant of the French polity around the issues of immigration, Islam, globalisation and the centralised French state. The BI & GI hope to be a lightning rod for such feelings.

Due to the economic problems facing much of Europe, the apparent tension surrounding immigration and the place of Islam in Europe, and popular criticism of the EU it’s likely BI & GI will engage in more acts of strategic provocation. In terms of media exposure, the mosque occupation has been successful with highly public denunciations from every major political party with the exception of the FN.

Posted in anti-Islam, counter-Jihad, Ethno Regionalism, Identitarianism, Islam, Mainstreaming, Media, Nationalism, Nationalist Advertising, Nationalist Communication, Nouvelle Droite, Racism | Tagged , , , , , , | Leave a comment

The European far right: actually right? Or left? Or something altogether different?

Marine Le Pen’s ability to attract nearly a fifth of the vote in the first round of the French presidential election was a resounding victory for her party.

While Le Pen’s Front National (FN) did not secure enough of the vote – 17.9% – to make the final run off, there is no doubt the FN voting bloc will be influential in deciding whether Nicolas Sarkozy retains office or Socialist candidate Francois Hollande becomes the 5th Republic’s first left President sinceFrancois Mitterand.

The message is clear: parties of the “far right” are now an established political force in mainstream European politics.

Inaccurate terminology

The success of the Front National hasn’t gone unnoticed in the popular media. In news coverage the FN and other members of the Nativist Populist (NP) party family are most often referred to as “far-right”. In the economic sense at least, the accuracy of the “far-right” descriptor is doubtful.

In the contemporary Anglosphere, “right” tends to refer to economic liberalism, free markets, corporatism and globalism. Taken to its logical conclusion, far-right economics would be radically libertarian laissez-faire capitalism in which the nation, in ethnic, cultural and structural terms, is rapidly moving towards its expiry date.

In an age when “right” has come to mean, less state and more markets and corporations, the economic policies offered by the NP parties are often further to the “left” than many of those offered by centrist social democrats.

Anti-globalisation

Le Pen’s own public utterances criticising “ultra liberalism” and mondialism (One Worldism) are evidence enough that her natural constituency is not the Davos set. Rather, she is distinctly protectionist in her economic positions, having described globalisation as “getting slaves to make things abroad to sell to unemployed people here”.

The NP parties tend to campaign on a cultural and a social axis. The cultural axis is traditionalist, the economic axis tends to be something best described as ethno-communitarianism with distinctly statist and leftist positions. These two axes make strategic sense when considering the FN’s targeted demographic.

French voters who support the Front National feel assailed on two fronts. First by cheap Chinese and other foreign imports local manufacturers cannot compete against, lest they start a “race to the bottom”. Second, they fear mass non-European immigration, mainly from Islamic Africa and Asia. They perceive themselves to be overwhelmed by free markets and open borders. The NP parties portray a situation where globalising elites make all the gains while the average citizen loses job security, identity and quality of life.

 

 

Many French voters have become disenfranchised with mainstream politics. EPA/France 2

 

 

NP economics are nativist in the sense they’re designed to protect the national interest against foreign capitalists in the age of globalisation, while simultaneously supporting intra-national homogeneity by restricting welfare.

Welfare for all, as long as they are us

This anti-globalist, and “welfare chauvinist” approach to economics is increasingly evident in the platform of theDansk Folkeparti (Danish People’s Party – DF), which has moved its economic policies approach from one of neo-liberalism, leftwards to a position that could be described as social democratic, in order to broaden its electoral appeal to working class ethnic Danes.

The nativists transcend the traditional right-left dichotomy of party politics by supporting the welfare state (albeit restricted to natives), while developing economic policies designed to protect native business, workers and culture from the perceived excesses of global free trade and Islamism.

The economics of the NPs are defensive. They support welfare and state led solutions to economic problems, and often support renationalisation of key state assets. Kent Ekeroth, spokesperson for the Sweden Democratsdescribed his party as a mixture of traditional Scandinavian social democracy and nationalism. Le Pen’s calls for the renationalisation of energy, transport, health and education put on the to the left of the French Socialist Party on such issues.

So when you see a party described as “far right” in the media, there’s every chance their economic policies are more statist than the centre Left, though your sure to find their immigration and law and order policies way diametrically opposed to the to those same “soft” left parties.

Beyond the left/right dichotomy

Dutch political scientist Cas Mudde has developed the most considered and precise understanding of the NP party family, concluding their defining features are nativism, populism and authoritarianism.

Considering the economic positions of the party family in Europe, the “far right” descriptor is inaccurate. In the current context such parties would be better referred as nationalist, ethno-communitarian, or populist to better express their positions which are a combination of what is a combination of traditionalist patriotic, conservatism and statist, protectionist, mixed economics.

Marine Le Pen’s refusal to back either Sarkozy or Hollande in the election run off is an indication that the NP parties aims to transcend the extant bipolar political axis – FN supporters chanted at their own May Day Rally “neither left nor right” and “this is our home, our country”.

For the FN it’s not a struggle between left and right, but between nationalism and internationalism in its left, right, corporate and Islamic guises.

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The Posters of the Swiss People’s Party: Alexander Segert and Nationalist Political Advertising

Of all the graphic political advertising of the nativist populist parties the poster design of the SVP stands alone.

This is due to its quality, and the supposed impact these posters have had on a number of referenda in Switzerland.

The striking design is the work of an advertising professional, Alexander Segert. He reports he has no political affiliation with the SVP, nor any particular interest in their policies. Instead he insists he’s a disinterested professional performing the best job he can for a paying client.

Due to Switzerland’s unique systems of direct democracy, if enough citizens (50 000/100 000) sign on, a referendum is called. Of particular noteworthiness was the successful referendum to ban the building of minarets. According to the SVP the minarets are political symbols of Islamic potency and imperialism.

In the lead up to the referenda a passage from a poem which Turkish president Erdogan had quoted was used as evidence of the aggressive symbolism of minarets:

“The mosques are our barracks, the domes our helmets, the minarets our bayonets and the faithful our soldiers…”

The banning of minarets was considered a considerable victory by the self-defined ‘counter-jihad’ movement (CJM). Indeed many consider it the first political victory in their struggle against Islam in Europe.

Segert’s poster was considered a crucial part of the campaign and it received wide coverage in international media.

The poster was imitated extensively by various other nativist populist parties and proves to be the most significant image of the European CJM.

Along with the minaret ban poster Segert has produced an array of posters for the SVP.

 

The Minaret poster
 
 
 
 
The Front National version with an Algerian flag superimposed on France
 
 
The BNP variant with the Erdogan quote
 
 
The German version from a group related to Pro Cologne
 
 
‘For greater safety’ – Segert clearly playing with the ambivalence of a black sheep
 
 
The German Variant
 
 
From the Lega Nord
 
 
A referendum against allowing foreigners to vote

 

 
 
Against Immigrant crime
 
 
 
Against the decriminalisation of drugs – featuring Amy Winehouse
 
 
Against passports for non-citizens
 
 
On a similar note
 
 
Against mass immigration 
 
The potential future of Switzerland
 
Segert
 
 
Segert’s SUV after being firebombed
 
 

As demonstrated Segert’s design is deliberately contentious and bold, so as to elicit a strong response from the electorate. Whether it would change someone’s mind on the issue is uncertain, but there’s every chance it may harden an extant sentiment.

Posted in Alexander Segert, anti-Islam, counter-Jihad, Islam, Mainstreaming, Nationalist Advertising, Nationalist Communication | Tagged , , , | Leave a comment

Antifa Artwork and Satirisation of the Nativist Populist Parties

Antifa refers to antifascist. They are left wing youth of various orientations. Those in Britain who rally against the EDL tend to be aligned to socialist movements, whilst those in Germany are more orientated towards anarchism.

The antifa see themselves as the vanguard against a fascist resurgence and as such are amongst the most vociferous and active opponents of nativist parties and movements. This being the case, they often engage in street fights against nationalist street movements in Germany.

There can be no doubt the Achilles heel of the new nativist movements and political parties eager to break into the mainstream is an association with fascism and Nazism. Hence their political rivals and satirists in general are eager to portray as fascists or Nazis.

The Antifa movement’s aesthetic approach suggests the utilitarian graphics reminiscent of their historical far left predecessors, sometimes combined with more contemporary graphic styles.

 

One of the most common images of the Antifa movement.
In most of Western Europe the number of actual Nazis is small. 
 
A stylistic reworking of the social realist artwork often favoured by the communists and socialists.
 
 
A take on the moderation of the FN under the leadership of Marine Le Pen. The graffiti says something along the lines of ‘Death to Blacks’ (in a derogatory sense).
It has been replaced with something akin to ‘people of colour’.
She tells the skinhead to wear pants and a tie to the next meeting.
 
The satirical weekly, Charlie Hebdo, portrays M. Le Pen as the model of designer Galliano after his drunken anti-Jewish outburst.
Marine le pen parodied as dancing with Hitler asking him about the 500 signatures she needs to run for president.
 
Antifa poster for a protest against the English Defence League. The 88 tattoos on the inner arms relate to the ‘Heil Hitler’, H being the eighth letter of the alphabet.  
 
The leadership of the EDL, at least, are consciously pro Zionist and philo-Semetic.
 
 

D|C will cover more of the political advertising and artwork of those opposed to the current batch of Euro nativists, as this is a memetic conflict in a period of accelerated time.

Posted in antifa, counter-Jihad, Front National, Marine Le Pen, Nazi, Racism | Tagged , , , , | 56 Comments

Identitarian Strategic Communication

In the upcoming series of articles on D|C will investigate and analyse the identitarian  network, Bloc Identitaire (BI). The series of articles features an English language interview with party leader, Fabrice Robert, in which he answers questions relating to the parties history, ideology, charges of racism, and the BI’s media/communications strategy.

My informal research into political communication, particularly in terms of visual mediums extends back decades. It’s included an array of parties and movements: anarchist, socialist, communist, environmentalist, capitalist, nationalist,  fascist and many hybrids of those orientations aforementioned.

But the self-described ‘Identitarian’, Bloc Identitaire is a unique. A ‘network’  perhaps the closest to the closest manifestation of the original vision developed by the French Nouvelle Droite (ND| New Right). The ND, and BI, are considered as  readily apparent rebranding of fascism by their critics, whilst their adherents consider them a  authentic return to the roots of European Civilisation.

Fabrice Robert with Filip De Winter of Vlaams Belang (Flemish Interest)

My original research into Identitarianism, which I will broadly describe as a nativist, traditionalist, ethno-regionalism/civilisationalism, developed after an initial interest in the Padanian (northern Italian) Lega Nord (LN|Northern League) and it’s significant political success.

In the popular press the LN was being referred to as far or extreme right. Further investigation suggested in some cases the party were in step with those policies traditionally related to the neofascist, but the particular inclinations of the LN were ideologically and aesthetically removed from what could accurately defined as neofascism.

The LN was a party of decentralisation, a party ideologically averse to militaristic imperialism so characteristic of the classical far right.  The LN was an ethno regionalist party that spoke in terms spoke of the cultural and political autonomy of ‘Padania’ in a similar fashion to Basque, Catalan and Flemish nationalists. Though whether Padania existed was contentious the party found significant success with the electorate.

The economic policy was seemingly centrist and there were socially liberal and conservative tendencies, and a concern with the natural and historic environment of Padania. 

The main criticism in the popular media was specifically related to the LN’s approach to immigration. According to the LN non-European immigration was a major threat to the the traditional culture of Padania – with Islamic expansionism being the most pronounced of these threats. Some of the LN’s media content was contentious and provocative.

“Guess Whose Last: for housing, work and health rights”
LN  poster featuring a senior ‘Padanian’ being ‘pushed aside’ by a Muslim, an African, a Gypsy and an Asian.

Formal research into European nationalist media strategies, particularly into the aesthetic, ideological and tonal evolution of parties like Vlaams Belang and the French Front National (FN) led me to the BI. A movement almost entirely unknown in the Anglosphere, though it did receive a small mention in Time related to the rise of European nationalism.

Bloc Identitaire is of particular interest for a number of reasons. The media focused and near situationist approach of its protests, the ideology of the party and it’s operation in the same area as the FN, the model party of contemporary European nationalism.

 

Posted in anti-Islam, counter-Jihad, Ethno Regionalism, Identitarianism, Mainstreaming, Nationalist Advertising, Nationalist Communication, Nouvelle Droite | Tagged , , , | Leave a comment

Permanent Media War: The Strategic Provocation of Bloc Identitaire & an Interview with Fabrice Robert

As a researcher into political communication my current research interest is the mainstreaming of peripheral parties via ownership of salient issues, and their strategic dissemination. My doctoral research uses the democratic nationalist populist parties of Western Europe and their criticism of Islamism as case studies.

Whilst doing research into the Front National (FN) I came across a movement seemingly unknown in the English-speaking world – the Bloc Identitaire (BI).

Considering my background reading into the Flemish Vlaams Belang, and the northern Italian (Padanian) Lega Nord I was interested in another manifestation of a political tendency I will refer to as Europeanist ethno-regionalism (EET).

Unlike the FN or the Sweden Democrats for example, the BI were different in their focus on the primacy of the regional identities that composed France, and perhaps more importantly their guerrilla media tactics, more typical of the Anarchist movement. This decentralisation would likely match the new communication modes enabled by social media.

Bloc Demonstration in Lyon Attended by EDL Members

The terrible legacy of WWII has seen the evolution of those parties that could be described as nationalist populist, consciously move away from the aesthetics and doctrines of fascists and Nazis to more moderate positions, deliberately avoiding associations with totalitarianism. Instead they tend to speak of democratic traditionalism and ethno-cultural autonomy against Islamist, corporate, mass immigration and other perceived globalising forces.

BI Symbol Adopted from the Film 300

Much like the rest of the nationalist populist movements in France the issue of Islam is a key campaign feature of BI. Their protests against the French equivalent of McDonalds, Quick, were notable.

The issue of halal food in is becoming increasingly politicised in Western Europe. Halal is the Muslim ritual slaughter of animals by having their throats cut, whilst the Muslim butcher states, “Allah al Akbar” (God is great). The animal is then ‘bled out’.

The issue became controversial for three principal reasons. Firstly halal meat was the only option available in certain food outlets, many non-Muslims were reportedly eating halal meat without their knowledge, and lastly the certification of halal meat comes at a cost. This cost is born by the consumer who maybe non-Muslim.

The actress Bridgette Bardot has gotten herself into some legal trouble after declaring halal butchery inhumane. More recently it has become a topic of debate between Le Pen and Sarkozy.

Of course the issue of halal was symbolic of the place of Islam in France specfically and Europe generally.

To protest against Quick’s use of halal meat BI activists staged a protest at the premises where they donned pig masks and danced around a Quick outlet in protest.

The March of the Pigs

Media stunts designed to provoke, in conjunction with social media usage make them a worthwhile study. As a relatively small movement they need to utilise strategic provocation in order to get create newsworthy events and raise their profile, or at least their issues. Fabrice Robert, leader of the BI, reports the media strategy of Green Peace is an inspiration in the following interview.

In terms of mainstream coverage the most successful of such provocative events was the  Saucisson et Pinard (Sausage and Wine) party planned for a Friday in a location close to a Mosque whose worshippers frequently spilled out on the street. The party aimed at highlighting the primacy of European culture in Paris by drinking wine and eating pork, both of which are forbidden in Islam – and feature heavily in traditional French cuisine.

Sausage & Wine Party

The party was subsequently banned in order to avoid conflict, but it received international media attention – and made concerns about street prayer a topic of debate at the national level.

Not quite as famous, but again, using pork as a provocation, was the handing of out of soupes identititaires (identity soups) to homeless people. The soups contained pork. Hence, the soup couldn’t be eaten by Muslim and Jewish people wishing to adhere to their specific religious diet.

The pork soup was banned in Strasbourg as a threat to public order after claims that it was racist.

As the FN under Marine Le Pen has shown a gentler face while adhering to their core platforms (the primacy of native French culture, law and order, concern about Islamism, economic nationalism, immigration) the BI has taken a deliberately activist approach to politics in order to gain coverage rarely received by smaller movements.

 

Introduction to the Interview

 A leading researcher into contemporary populist nationalism and far right parties and social movements, Cas Mudde, reports he finds the subjects and ideas current within the nationalist milieu are commonplace amongst a large portion of the native populaces in many European countries. Like  other researchers into European nationalism he notices a change in tone and hue in the communication of their platform. The communication of this change is the core issue of my research.

When interviewing members of movements contentious in nature it offers the researcher a number of challenges and ethical issues too substantial to discuss here. The end point is the development of nationalist movements in Europe and elsewhere, and their strategic communication is a worthy subject of study and one of the most considerable issues in European politics at this point in time. Being as balanced as possible and maintaining objectivity is the key in such circumstances.

As you can see there are a number of issues which arise from this interview (performed by email), which will serve as the future topics for research such as the power of nostalgia in nationalist political advertising, agenda setting by media provocation, and the integration of Gramscian thought into nationalist communication strategy using social media.

Of interest would be a comparison to other nationalist regionalist movements in and beyond Europe, such as Baluchs, Tibetans, Japanese nationalists, Basque Nationalists and Kosovar Serbs. Of course the circumstances, platfroms and the severity of the particular movements are radically different, but there appears to be some overlay in aesthetics and methods of strategic communication.

The most apparent similarities are a sense of being overwhelmed by a non-native group, the rigorous and deliberate of maintenance of native culture (and in some cases the rediscovery of it) and it’s public expression, and the application of strategic nostalgia as a key tool in political advertising and communication.

 

Bloc Identitaire

 Fabrice Robert is a self-confessed former radical nationalist militant. The direction his movement has taken in adopting pop culture icons (such as the Spartans from the film 300) and the movement’s use of social and guerrilla media make it rare in nationalist politics and worthy of investigation.

This interview covers basic questions about the movement with a particular emphasis on communication.

To my knowledge this is the only interview with Fabrice Robert in English.

Like Matthew Goodwin of Northampton University, interviewing party activists and members would be useful to garner a thorough understanding of the parties. According to Goodwin such parties are likely to remain strong and gain amongst large sections of European communities. How they reach those potential movement members and voters is a subject worthy of study.

 

Interview with Fabrice Robert – President of Bloc Identitiare

This interview was conducted via email

Fabrice Robert Holding Mike

1. Firstly could you tell me the name/s and position/s of the party members responding to this questionnaire?

Fabrice Robert, 40, I am the president of the Bloc Identitaire. Postgraduate in the field of strategic information, I earn my living as an internet consultant. Former militant of the radical right, I created the Bloc identitaire in 2003, a movement often described by political scientists and analyst as an ideological think tank providing ideas to others parties.

With the Bloc identitaire, my purpose was to bring under the same roof all those who had at the heart of their consciences the defence of our ethnic identities. Our choices in matters of strategy and methods of action, enabled us to surprise the media, to grab the attention of our countrymen and, at the end, to have a significant impact on the political life of the country.

To give you an example, I am one of the main co-organisers of the flash street party «Sausisson-pinard » (sausage- wine) in Paris on June 18th 2010. Six months later, we were able to organise the first the international conference on Islamisation. Those two events draw the attention of the media, not only in France, but also in the whole world and contributed to the freedom of speech on Islam in France.

 

2. How many members and affiliates are there in the BI ?

 The Bloc identitaire by itself has over 2,000 party members. If you include all the peripheral organisations we count 3000 militants active in political, cultural and social fields.

 

3. Could you describe your organisational structure?

 The identity block is headed by a Bureau Politique (sort of National Executive Committee) and the Conseil fédéral (sort of National Policy Forum). The movement run on a day to day basis by regional coordinators.

The Bloc Identitaire is at the heart of every political initiative at a national level in defense of our identity. It may work in synergy with other structures (non-profits, think tanks, political parties…).

The Bloc Identitaire is a crucial component of the whole identity movement, whose other partners include movements (such as Nissa Rebela in Nice, Alsace d’abord, an Alsatian identity movement and many others), the Houses of Identity (La Traboule in Lyons, Lou Bastioun in Nice, Ty Breizh in Brittany, etc.), our youth branch (l’Autre jeunesse), and specialised structures (publishing, internet, social networks, etc.).

All these parts of the identity movement gather at the Conseil fédéral, which is the expression of all the “realities” of the identity movement, those who do the actual work.

The Bloc Identitaire never used the traditional pyramidal structures of the old parties inherited from the XIXth century. We favour an efficient network of local structures and specialised bodies. The Bloc identitaire is the national label for all the local initiatives.

The Bloc identitaire is better defined as a network rather than a conventional political party.

“Things Have to Change” – Emphasis on Regional Identities “Rebels from Nice”

4. For most English speakers the nationalism in France is usually equated to the Front National. Could you tell me what the key differences in your policies are?

 What sorts of relationship do have with Front National?

 What is your opinion of Marine Le Pen?

First of all, we differ from that party by the methods. The Front national focuses only on the electoral battleground. We believe that the power does not come only through the ballot box. The electoral process is only one possibility of action and not an end in itself.

We are good followers of Antonio Gramsci. Thus, we believe that in order to take the political power in a country, it is still necessary a preliminary and successful conquest of the minds. The struggle for the cultural hegemony must be total and therefore take different modes of action: agitprop operations, community network development, creation of alternative media, development of our presence on of the Internet, etc.

Antonio Gramsci – Italian Communist – Advocate of Cultural Hegemony

We also substantially differ from the Front national on the ground of the ideas. The National Front is hostile to European ideals, to regionalisation and to the idea of an ethnic identity. We firmly believe in three levels of belonging : region / nation / Europe.

The National Front stands for a vision of national identity closely associated with the acceptance of “republican values” inherited from the French revolution. It would therefore be enough to any foreigner to accept these values to become a full French? It’s not our point of view. For us, it is necessary to defend a vision of ethno-cultural identity. That’s why our struggle is directed to the defence of our three different levels of identity : local (regional), historical (French) and civilizational (European). For the Front national, these identities are antagonistic. For us, they are complementary, they belong to a whole.

Concerning Marine Le Pen, as the French like to say : « I will not insult the future ». But, to my knowledge, Marine Le Pen does not share most of the ideas we stand for, even if it sometimes has reused some of our themes. Moreover, we should see how much the Front national is ready to adopt important points for us: to end the birthright citizenship, to stop the policy of Family reunification and to reverse the migratory flows. With respect to Islamization, I am also waiting to see if Marine Le Pen is hostile to the building of any mosques on French soil, or if she is only hostile to the building of mosques publicly funded, which is very different.

 

5. From your manifesto it appears that you are heavily influenced by GRECE [The intellectual group associated with the Continental New Right] intellectuals, Guillaume Faye in particular? Can you tell me what influence they have had on your movement? Are there any other intellectuals that have influenced your platform, historical and contemporary?

 We trace our political roots in the Catholic social teaching, in the French socialism of a Proudhon or a Sorel, in the European federalism of a great European like Coudenhove-Kalergi or a brithon [Breton] like Yann Fouéré who dreamt a Europe of a Hundred Flags, a Europe base on the rich fabric of our different regional identities, without of course forgetting the contributions of the” New Right ” where Alain de Benoist and Guillaume Faye played a crucial role. But those predecessors are more role models or sources of inspiration than strict ideological masters.

The European identity movement, in France as well in the rest of the continent, a new phenomenon, both in its composition and in its modes of operation, which cannot legitimately be attached to any past movement.

The GRECE, that set the pieces in motion in the late years of the sixties, especially in the field of ideological war, remains for us a major source of inspiration. I note that their action was often limited to discussions in Parisian salons. Our ambitions are different. We want to have results on the practical ground, to change people’s lives. One might consider that the Bloc is a mix between the GRECE metapolitical action and Greenpeace field operations.

 

6. The Lega Nord has a range of political tendencies amongst its members; does this occur in the BI?

And if so how do you manage different factions? For example there are social democratic regionalists, traditionalist Catholics (Society of Pope Pius X), those who are primarily interested in the environment, pre Christian religions (Celtic and Germanic paganism).

 There are no, strictly speaking, political tendencies within the identity movement. Most of our members join when they begin to understand that mass immigration and Islamization are a danger to our civilization. Some may have different religious backgrounds (Catholic, atheist, polytheist, etc.), some may have different interests (ecology, social, cultural, etc.).

But once in the movement, the militants have a purpose stronger than their differences: the survival of our identity.

That is the efficiency of the network. To unite different profiles and different skills, enabling the development of projects that will serve the entire community.

The identitarians arise from the idea that we are the fruit of a land and a lineage, a link in a chain of life. To be an identitarian does not refer to a dogma – with its unique truth – or an ideology – with its intellectual constructions far away from reality –, to be an identitarian refers to the reality of our lives.

 

7. The BI is noted for a media campaign that could be considered a nationalist situtationism. Protests seem to feature acts that are likely to grab attention of the media and the public. For example the soupes identitiares and the protests against halal Quick involving pig masks? Could you tell the story about the pork sausage and wine parties and Sylvie Francois ?

 We do not indulge in vain chattering or in useless jabbering. We act to provoke a debate in our society and to get concrete results.

For instance, the now famous “Apero saucisson pinard” held on June 18th, 2010 in Paris. To do this, we put under the sunlights a character, Sylvie Francois, who presented herself to the media as a resident of the Goutte d’Or, shocked by the illegal Muslim prayers organized by militant Islamist on the streets of her neighborhood. She then proposed to organize an “Apéritif saucisson pinard” to protest publicly against the Islamization of our country.

The announcement provoked a real scandal in the mass media and let no other alternative to the government to react to the real scandal, the illegal occupation of several streets of Paris for prayers organized by Islamist. The liberal press and the intellectual pundits denounced an unacceptable provocation intended to stigmatize the Muslim presence in France.

Finally, the television broadcast images of prayers in the street and the general public discovered a fact that was left in the dark for a long time. Our intervention has helped to arise awareness among the French and enabled ordinary people to speak freely about the Islamization of our land.

Our initiative evolved to be an outstanding success.

A few months later, we several members of the French political class integrated our discourse in their own. Then Claude Gueant, Interior Minister, announced a ban on Muslim prayers in the streets. Meanwhile, in an Ifop / Le Monde’s poll, 68% of the French considered the integration of people of Muslim origin a failure. This poll illustrates two important points: we are in harmony with the French and we play a crucial role in the awakening of our people.

Our operation « Apéro géant saucisson et pinard à La Goutte d’Or » was an astonishing success and validated our methods and concepts.

 

8. Is the theatrical nature of your protests designed to grab media attention? How successful have they been? How did you develop this style of campaigning?

 Our purpose is to be present everywhere, to wage a permanent media war on the news front, to appear as the grain of sand in the gears of the system and to win victories bringing hope to our people.

The Bloc identitaire today is the movement with the know-how to use provocation to open a public debate. But the real challenge is not to stage an action, is to let it know to the general public. We achieved that goal thanks to our mastery of the Internet. We have activists versed in new technologies that could be called “dissidents 2.0″. With the development of web 2.0, every activist can become a medium in its own and become an individual force of opposition. Thus, we produce our own news content, which are then picked up by mainstream media. For example, is what happened with the invasion of a muslim fast food. Our video was relayed by large French TV channels to become the buzz of the week.

I often say that the street and computer networks are our offices. On the ground, close to our people, we are also launching our web appeals to traditional values.

 

9. Could you discuss the response to the soupes identitiares from the other parties, the media and the legal system? Did you except the response you received? By using contentious acts do you hope to promote media coverage even if it isn’t favourable? Would you prefer no media coverage or negative media coverage?

 When you are in the middle of rough political action, we must accept the idea of being reported – sometimes agressively and in a biased way – by the media and violently denounced by your opponents. The plain facts we report are not always pleasent to the ears of our elites. But we think that today has opened a big gap between the few who govern us – the world hyper class – and the true french people.

The latter is no longer taken in by some lies, he can learn through other channels – including through websites réinformation – it is sensitive to the straight-talking and those who speak their words by transcribing what ‘they suffer on a daily basis. Until recently, a study Ifop / Paris Match / Europe 1 (November 2011) revealed that 76% of French people think that Islam is growing too. Our opponents may well denounce us and we try to criminalize. The fact remains that if they speak to us – even negatively – they make us better known to the general public. However, recent surveys show that a majority of the general public is more in tune with us on issues such as immigration and Islam …

 

10. Of your protests which do you deem to be the most successful and why do you believe this to be the case?

 We lobbied against rap groups with insulting lyrics for the French-born and we successfully broke the wall of media censorship and imposed the idea that there is also an anti-white racism.

Through initiatives like the Identity soup, we recalled that social activism should not remain the monopoly of the xenophile left and the dire tragedy of our people in need.

Developing communication tools such as Novopress.info, we now have our own media. We are now able to expand our audience and connect with a wider audience.

Multiplying initiatives against the rampant Islamisation of France (call of the muezzin, streets renamed with Islamic names, etc…), we have contributed to open the eyes of the French on the development of Islam.

The Bloc identitaire is a firm believer in the value of lobbying and street activism to favour our cause. With this long shot strategy, we have thus advanced the political debate in France on topics as diverse as anti-white racism, self- defense, localism or Islamization.

But our main victory is semantic. Who eight years ago used the word “identity”? Nobody. Today, almost everyone uses it. This word means something important in the present French and European political debate.

BI Overlay on Street Sign

 

11. There has been criticism in France that the BI is racist. What is your response to this charge?

 We uphold a vision of ethno-cultural identity. For us, identity is what differentiates one Nation from another. The diversity of nations it’s also what makes the rich fabric of mankind. As identitarians, every People on the surface of the earth has an inalienable right for its own and distinct identity. Our motto has only two words : be yourself.

When we see the development of anti-white and anti-French racisms and the various political and religious communitarianism [sectarianism?], we face a very big problem. We believe that the multicultural and multiracial societies often become «multiracist». In defending identities, we fight to achieve a more harmonious society. Our slogan “100% identity, 0% racism” sums up our position. Every nation must grow on his land.

 

12. How do you feel about having Muslim majority states like Bosnia, Albania and Kosovo in such a European confederation?

 I am convinced that these Muslim national homes are dangerous. They do not follow an European agenda, they are the loyal servants of foreign interest. Among those interests, not only I mention the Islamic nations, but also the United States, eager to use the Muslim minorities to weaken and divide the Europeans. I do not forget, either, the miserable fate of non-Muslim minorities in Muslim majority countries (as in Kosovo …). These lands of Islam are for me nothing but warts on European soil. Only a strong Europe, proud of its identity and civilizational heritage, may solve this problem.

 

13. Around Europe parties that have various degrees of success have focused their campaigns on immigration and Islam in Europe?

Do you find that these issues effectively define European nationalism at this point in history?

How effective do you believe they have been in gathering support for your movement?

Regarding the phenomenon of immigration-invasion affecting Europe, we believe that integration and assimilation are only achievable on a small number of individuals. But today we are dealing with a huge phenomenon that can actually cause a substitution of populations.

On the development of Islam, this religion is profoundly inconsistent with the values of European civilization. Islam is a foreign body in our history, our customs and our political culture. We also know that Islam is not a mere faith. Both religion and ideology, Islam leads to totalitarianism. Now we have to deal with aggressive proselytizing and protest (removal of pork in the school menus, multiplication of mosques, request to segregate women in public services, etc.). It’s a challenge to our civilizational model.

But let us not forget that the development of Islam is the result of immigration. Each year, 300 000 foreigners (mostly African and Muslim) land on our shores, legally and illegally, increasing the weight of non-French communities in our country. This Immigration, coupled with rapid population growth of Muslims (3.8 children per Muslim woman in France), is the main cause of the growth of Islam.

Our continent is confronted to these threats. It explains why the question of identity is at the heart of the political debate in Europe. When Angela Merkel, David Cameron and even Nicolas Sarkozy acknowledge the failure of multiculturalism, the read a line from our program.

Each other day, more and more Europeans become aware of the increased and malevolent presence of Islam in Europe. This awareness brings a broad popular support for identitarian causes.

 

14. What other political parties and movements do you have a strong relationship with (EDL, Vlaams Belang, PxC for example)? 


How often do you benefit from such networks and what do you hope to gain from them in the future?

 Today, we feel especially close to movements such as the Vlaams Belang, the Lega Nord, PxC [Catalonian ethno-regionalist party] and OPS. We are thus the French term of these populist movements and identity that grow strongly in Europe. There are, of course, links with the leaders of these movements. Ties that we intend to develop through concrete joint actions.

As Identitaires we feel profoundly European. We believe in Europe as a civilization and therefore part and parcel of our identity.

We will not win alone. Our struggle must be waged across Europe with the movements that share our values and the civilizational consciousness.

 

15. John Laughland has written an article in the English magazine, the Spectator, called “Liberty, Egality, Fecundity.” In that article he describes a trend amongst traditionalist Catholics to have very large families in a ‘demographic race’ with Muslim immigrants?

Have you noticed such a phenomenon in your party members?

What do you think about the demographic issues in Europe?

 I read this article too. John Laughland did not target only the catholic families. He mentioned those large families as a trend among the French families more conscious of the challenges we face, Catholic or not. It’s a fact that in the young generation, large families begin to be the norm. It’s the battleground of the cradles. Let me tell you an example. A few month ago, I was invited to a party. At this gathering, three families totaled 18 children. All the parents were middle class, not at all the kind of people Laughland described.

Ultra Conservative Archbishop Lefebvre of Society Pope Pius X

We must, indeed, to cope with large populations of non-European peoples who settled on our soil. This awareness is not just the characteristic of Catholic families or members of the Bloc identitaire. Having children is a militant act in its own right and that affects everyone regardless of his religious views. We realize that what we are today, we must – in large part – to our ancestors. And we know that we in turn have a responsibility and duty towards our offspring. Duties of transmission but also to save a cultural and historical heritage.

 

16. What sort of political organisation do you propose for the Europe?

A confederation of autonomous regions, then a national state, then a European civilisation (Breton, French, European)?

Will regions have completely independence or autonomy?

 Defending the principle of a regional France in the Europe of Peoples, we advocate the full implementation of the subsidiarity principle in European construction. The higher political level only hands those tasks, which cannot be performed effectively at a more immediate or local level.

In this condition, Europe will finally benefit from the dynamism of its regions and energy of its people to generate a political ambition to match his heritage: a federated and strong Europe, playing on the same ground as the new emerging empires and contributing to a more peaceful planet.

The Bloc identitaire thus defends the idea of a federal France, respectful of local freedoms and identities.

Fin

 

 

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